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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
SUPREME COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
339

Brentrup v. Culkin
(decided November 30, 1995)

Petitioner, the children's guardian ad litem, brought a motion
seeking closure of the courtroom during a custodial
proceeding. 340 Petitioner argued that the interest and attention of
both the public and the media would be harmful and humiliating

34 1
to the children and an intrusion into the family's private life.
However, the supreme court rejected petitioner's argument,

finding that the "[c]omplete closure of the courtroom in this

matter would be neither narrowly tailored nor the least intrusive
manner in which to address the possibility of real harm to the
children." 342 In reaching its determination, the court recognized
that the right of the public and the press to attend court
proceedings is constitutionally protected under both the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution 3 4 3 and article 1,

section 8 of the New York Constitution, 344 and, therefore, such a
right will only be impinged where "there are compelling reasons
for closure."345

The courtroom proceeding at issue in this case involved the
custody of the children of the Culkin family, several of whom are

339. 635 N.Y.S.2d 1016 (Sup. Ct. New York County 1995).
340. Id. at 1018.
341. Id. at 1019.
342. Id.
343. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall
make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id.
344. N.Y. CONST. art I, § 8. This section provides in pertinent part:
"Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and no law shall be
passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." Id.
345. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1017 (citing Merrick v. Merrick, 154
Misc. 2d 559, 562, 585 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1992), aff'd, 190 A.D.2d 516, 593 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't 1993)).
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well-known child actors. 34 6 Specifically, the dispute central to
the custody proceeding involved a determination of "which
parent is better able to care for the children, including managing
and directing the careers of these child actors." '347 It is

significant and worth noting that the family is one of professional
actors, which made "the family... by definition in the
limelight." 3 4 8

In support of the petition, the children's guardian ad litem
proffered certain affidavits intending to detail particularly
harmful and humiliating circumstances to be brought out at trial;
however, the only real concern which came to light from the
affidavit was the intrusion by the press on the privacy of the
family. 349 In denying petitioner's motion, the court recognized
that "[t]he right of the public and press to attend court
proceedings is generally a constitutional entitlement." 350 The
346. Id. at 1018. The court recognized that, as child actors, these children
were not "ordinary" in the sense that they were no strangers to the media and
its effects upon them. Id.
347. Id. at 1019.
348. Id. at 1018. The court noted that "the most famous of [the children] is
known internationally and has been called the best-known child actor since
Shirley Temple." Id.
349. Id. at 1019. The court conceded that the public and press were
interested in this case due to the notoriety of the family which made this case
different from other custody cases where "most of the time the press is not
clamoring to attend such trials." Id. However, even if the public wanted "to
watch or report on a trial [this] cannot in itself serve as the basis to close a
custody trial." Id. As the supreme court logically asked, "[a]re we to close
courtrooms for custody trials only when the press and public want to attend?"
Id.

350. Id. at 1017. See supra notes 114-231. See also Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980) (applying this constitutional
entitlement to criminal trials and finding that "the historical evidence
demonstrates conclusively that at the time when our organic laws were
adopted, criminal trials both here and in England have long been presumptively
open"); Associated Press v. Bell, 70 N.Y.2d 32, 38, 510 N.E.2d 313, 316,
517 N.Y.S.2d 444, 447 (1987) (holding that a suppression hearing, involving
the high profile murder case of accused murderer Robert Chambers, could not
be closed because "a hypothetical risk of prejudice or taint cannot justify
categorical denial of public access to suppression hearings" since the public
and the press have a First Amendment right to attend such hearings).
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court examined this right of access under an analysis of both

federal 3 5 1 and state3 5 2 caselaw, as well as statutory3 5 3
imperatives. 3 5 4 However, the Supreme Court recognized that this

right of access to court proceedings is not an absolute right. 355
There are certain "potentially delicate types of proceedings"

where the court may "in its discretion, exclude therefrom all
persons who are not directly interested therein ....

"

356

351. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court [hereinafter Press-Enterprise
1/], 478 U.S. 1 (1986); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court [hereinafter
Press-Enterprise1], 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
352. Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 77 N.Y.2d 1, 564 N.E.2d 1046,
563 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1990); In re Associated Press, 70 N.Y.2d 32, 510 N.E.2d
313, 517 N.Y.S.2d 444 (1987); Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v.
Leggett, 48 N.Y.2d 430, 399 N.E.2d 518, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1979); In re
Katherine B., 189 A.D.2d 443, 596 N.Y.S.2d 847 (2d Dep't 1993); In re
Douglas, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 31, 1995, at 37 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County).
353. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 4 (McKinney 1983). This section provides in
relevant part:
The sittings of every court within this state shall be public, and every
citizen may freely attend same, except that in all proceedings and trials
in cases for divorce, seduction, abortion, rape, and assault with intent to
commit rape, sodomy, bastardy or filiation, the court may, in its
discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are not directly interested
therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the court.
Id. Furthermore, section 235(2) of the New York Domestic Relations Law
provides in relevant part:
If the evidence on the trial of such an action or proceeding be such that
public interest requires that the examination of the witnesses should not
be public, the court or referee may exclude all persons from the room
except the parties to the action and their counsel, and in such case may
order the evidence, when filed with the clerk, sealed up, to be exhibited
only to the parties to the action or proceeding or someone interested, on
order of the court.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 235(2) (McKinney 1986).
354. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1018.
355. Id. at 1017. See also Westchester Rockland Newspapers, 48 N.Y.2d at
438, 399 N.E.2d at 522, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
356. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1018. See also N.Y. Jut. LAw § 4
(McKinney 1983). See supra note 353.
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The Brentrup court, utilizing the two part test enunciated in
Press-Enterprise Company v. Superior Court357 and later
followed in the New York case of In re Johnson Newspaper
Corp. V. Melino, 35 8 which determined whether the public and
press should be allowed to invoke this constitutional right to gain

access to certain court proceedings. First, "the forum or type of
proceeding [must be one] which has been historically open to the

public." 359 Second, it must be determined whether public access
plays a "significant positive role" in the functioning of the
process in question. 3 6 0 Furthermore, once it is determined that

the public or press has a right of access to a court proceeding, a
further inquiry must be undertaken to determine whether there is
a "compelling reason[] for closure" of the courtroom. 3 6 1 A
357. 478 U.S. 1 (1985).
358. 77 N.Y.2d 1, 564 N.E.2d 1046, 563 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1990).
359. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1018. See Press-Enterprise1, 464 U.S. at
505 (determining that a review of the "historical evidence" dating back to
when "our organic laws were adopted," reveals that "since the development of
trial by jury, the process of selection of jurors has presumptively been a public
process with exceptions only for good cause"). See also Press-EnterpriseII,
478 U.S. at 10 (holding that there has been a "tradition of public accessibility
to preliminary hearings conducted in California"); Richmond Newspapers, 448
U.S. at 577 (finding "[t]he right of access to places traditionally open to the
public, as criminal trials have long been, may be seen as assured by the
amalgam of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press"); In re
Johnson, 77 N.Y.2d at 7, 564 N.E.2d at 1049, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 383
(recognizing that "there is no suggestion that professional disciplinary hearings
have any tradition to being open to the public"); Westchester Rockland
Newspapers, 48 N.Y.2d at 441-43, 399 N.E.2d at 524-25, 423 N.Y.S.2d at
637-38 (finding that in a criminal case, the public has a right to have access to
preliminary proceedings including the suppression hearing and pretrial
competency hearing).
360. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1018. See Press-Enterprise1, 464 U.S. at
508 (determining that the "open trial... plays a[n] important.., role in the
administration of justice ...[because it] enhances both the basic fairness of
the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public
confidence in the system").
361. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1018. See In re Associated Press, 70
N.Y.2d at 39, 510 N.E.2d at 317, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 448 (finding a compelling
reason to warrant closure of a suppression hearing to be "specific
findings... demonstrating that first, there is a substantial probability that the
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"viable showing of actual and substantial harm" may constitute

such a compelling reason to warrant closure. 362 However, even
where such a harm may be shown, the "nature and extent of the
asserted harm must be balanced against the competing interest of
keeping the courtroom open." 363 Moreover, the party moving for
closure has the burden of demonstrating that the "proposed
limitations on the public's right of access are (1) essential to
preserve a higher value; (2) narrowly tailored to serve that
364
interest; and (3) effective at preventing the identified harm."
In addition, "it has also been suggested that [the] court has the
authority to consider reasonable alternatives less invasive of the

public's right to access to judicial proceedings than closure of the
365
courtroom during the entire trial."

defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that closure
would prevent and, second, reasonable alternatives to closure cannot
adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights").
362. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1018. See In re Katherine B., 189 A.D.2d
443, 445, 596 N.Y.S.2d 847, 849 (2d Dep't 1993) (finding a viable showing
of actual and substantial harm in allowing "continued public and media
exposure" of a child protective proceeding commenced under Family Court
Act article 10 because due to the particularly sensitive nature of the proceeding
it would not be in the best interest of the alleged neglected and abused child).
But see Sprecher v. Sprecher, N.Y. L.J., June 21, 1988, at 21 (Sup. Ct. New
York County), modified sub nom. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 158 A.D.2d
296, 297, 550 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (1st Dep't 1990) (finding that the plaintiff
mother in the custody proceeding did "not establish sufficient grounds to
warrant closing the court. . . [since] the unsupported speculation by her
counsel as to the deleterious effect that media coverage might have on the child
[was) simply inadequate to overcome the strong presumption that court
proceedings be open to the public").
363. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1018. See Sprecher, N.Y. L.J., June 21,
1988, at 21 (applying this balancing test to a custody proceeding and holding
that "[tihe court must balance the best interest of the child with the public's
right of information," since a "closed courtroom would inhibit the public's
legitimate right to be educated about the child rearing practices of [the
mother's] group within its own community").
364. See Press-Enterprise1, 464 U.S. at 509-510; Press-EnterpriseII, 478
U.S. at 14; In re Associated Press, 70 N.Y.2d at 39, 510 N.E.2d at 317, 517
N.Y.S.2d at 448; see also Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett,
48 N.Y.2d 430, 399 N.E.2d 518, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1979).
365. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1018. See In re Associated Press, 70
N.Y.2d at 39, 510 N.E.2d at 317, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 448. See supra note 363.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1996], Art. 32

964

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

Although, this two-tiered test has traditionally been applied in
the criminal setting in order to establish the constitutionality of
access to criminal court proceedings by the public and media, it
has lately been extended to civil judicial proceedings. 366 In fact,
the court in Brentrup found that there should be no distinction
between civil and criminal matters since "public scrutiny of a
custody trial indeed can 'promote fairness and due process and
'
tends to prevent perjury, misconduct and biased results.' "367
Thus, public access has a similar effect in the civil as well as
criminal realm.
In the case at bar, the court applied this two-tiered test and
determined that the public and media had a right of access to the
proceeding since both tiers had been satisfied. 3 68 First, custody
proceedings and trials held in the New York State Supreme Court
have "historically been open to the public." 369 Second, "public
access has always played a significant and positive role in the
Supreme Court." 370 Specifically, "the public has a legitimate
interest in knowing the substance of court proceedings, and the
integrity of the judiciary is protected by keeping those
proceedings open." 37 1 Having determined that there is a
presumption that judicial proceedings are open to the press and
public, the court in Brentrup progressed to the next inquiry of
determining whether there was a compelling reason to warrant
372
closure of the courtroom in the present custody proceeding.
In a custody proceeding, "[t]he public interest must be
acknowledged to include the protection of children generally
from injury .... However, we cannot assume that harm will
366. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n. 17 (stating that "historically
both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open"). See also
Merrick, 154 Misc. 2d 559, 585 N.Y.S.2d 989; Sprecher, N.Y. L.J., June 21,
1988, at 21.
367. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1017-18 (citing In re Douglas, N.Y. L.J.,
Mar. 31, 1995, at 37 (Surr. Ct. Westchester County)).
368. Id. at 1017.

369. Id.
370. Id.

371. Id. (citing Westchester Rockland Newspapers, Inc. v. Leggett, 48
N.Y.2d 430, 399 N.E.2d 518, 423 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1979)).
372. Id. at 1017 (citations omitted).
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of public access to

a custody

result merely by virtue

trial,... [o]therwise all custody trials would be required to be

closed to the public." 3 7 3 The court recognized that in most
instances courtroom closure is not sought because access by the

media and public is rarely sought. 374 However, due to the nature
and circumstances surrounding the present action, and in
particular, the notoriety of the family in question, the press and

public have sought access. 375 The court noted that this fact alone
cannot change the standard for determining the present issue,

thus, "a viable showing must be made that actual, substantial
harm, emotional or physical, will result to the children from such
public access to the proceedings, which can be avoided by sealing
the courtroom .... And even then, the asserted harm must be

balanced against the competing interest of keeping the courtroom
open. "376

The court determined that there was no showing of a
substantial harm which would be substantially compelling to
warrant the closure of the courtroom during the pendency of the

custody proceeding. 377 The mere fact that there could be negative
elements surrounding the family was insufficient to constitute a
compelling reason for closure of the courtroom to the public and
media. 3 7 8 Furthermore, the dispute involved in this custody
373. Id. at 1018.
374. Id.
375. Id. See supra notes 346-349 and accompanying text.
376. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1018. See also Sprecher, N.Y. L.J., June
21, 1988, at 21.
377. Brentrup, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 1019. The court noted that there had been
"no allegations involving areas likely to cause such personal embarrassment,
such as physical or sexual abuse." Id.
378. Id. at 1018. In fact, the court noted the implications of the family's
notoriety and its effects on the outcome of this issue:
This family is by definition in the limelight, and all are the equivalent of
public figures. Coverage in the media is a fundamental part of their
lives, and must necessarily include negative as well as positive, pressrelease style information. While it is unpleasant to read, or have others
read, about negative elements of one's family relationships, that
unpleasantness alone does not demonstrate harm.
Id. Moreover, sealing the courtroom will not have the "desired effect of
causing the press to lose interest in either the trial or family." Id. at 1019.
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proceeding centered more on the parents rather than the
children. 379 The court recognized that:
The trial w[ould] largely concern the parties' interpersonal skills
and business acumen, and testimony w[ould] in all likelihood
focus primarily not on the conduct or personalities of the
children, but on those of the parents. Such evidence does not rise
to the level of private matters whose exposure would be injurious
3 80
to the children.
Moreover, the court found that the petitioner did not meet her
burden of demonstrating that closure of the courtroom would be
either narrowly tailored or "the least intrusive manner in which
' 38 1
to address the possibility of real harm to the children."

Although the court recognized the potential for certain testimony
to be humiliating to the children, it determined that, if such
circumstances did arise, closing of the courtroom for those
limited portions of the trial upon an in camera review of the
testimony would be the least intrusive manner to address this
3 82
possibility of harm to the children.

Therefore, the court, under both the Federal and State
Constitutions, denied petitioner's motion for closure of the
courtroom in this custody proceeding absent a demonstrative
showing of substantial harm to the children. The court stated the
requested closure was neither narrowly tailored nor the least
intrusive means to prevent the substantial harm. 3 83 Thus, there
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id. The court in its decision noted:
However, it may well be that testimony will be taken, which might be
personally humiliating to some of the children: for instance, if the
testimony of the forensic psychiatrist will include psychological
diagnoses, evaluations of maladjustment or other assertions likely to
humiliate a child. If that is the case, I will entertain in camera offers of
proof and upon an appropriate showing, will close the courtroom for
that portion of the trial. With the assistance of counsel in monitoring the
expected testimony, the court should be able to avoid the publicizing of
any humiliating information regarding the children.
Id.

383. Id. at 1018-19.
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are no real distinctions to be drawn, under either federal or state

constitutional analysis, when dealing with the right to freedom of
the press, particularly public and media access to courtroom
proceedings.
384
City of New York v. Dana

(decided April 16, 1995)

The defendants, Raymond Dana and 236 W. 54th St. Corp.,
owners and operators of an adult movie theater known as "The
New David Cinema," opposed a proceeding that would grant the
City of New York a preliminary injunction to close the cinema.
Defendant's argued that the injunction would violate the New

York State Constitution's guarantee of freedom of expression. 385
Defendants urged that article I, section 8, of the New York State
Constitution as construed by the New York Court of Appeals in
Arcara v. Cloud Books, 3 8 6 precluded granting the preliminary

384. 165 Misc. 2d 409, 627 N.Y.S.2d 273 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1995).
385. Id. at 414, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 276. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8. This
section states in relevant part: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and
publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that
right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or
of the press." Id. The defendants did not invoke their right to free speech
under the United States Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First
Amendment states that: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press ...

."

Id.

386. 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986). In
Arcara, the New York Court of Appeals held that "when government
regulation designed to carry out a legitimate and important State objective
would incidentally burden free expression, the government's action cannot be
sustained unless the State can prove that it is no broader than needed to achieve
its purpose." Id. at 558, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847. The Arcara
court stated that "[if] other sanctions, such as arresting the offenders, or
injunctive relief prove unavailing," then the state's burden under the standard
would be met. Id. at 559, 503 N.E.2d at 495, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 847. The
important state interest in Arcara was the abatement of public nuisances (the
premises were used to engage in prostitution). Id. at 556, 503 N.E.2d at 494,
510 N.Y.S.2d at 846.
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